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SUMMARY 
 
The Government Report on Defence to Parliament provides the defence policy 
guidelines for the manner in which Finland’s defence capability is maintained, 
developed and used. The Defence Report and its implementation will ensure that 
Finland’s defence capability meets the requirements of the security environment.  
The Defence Report was written following the publication of the Final Report of the 
Parliamentary Assessment Group (Publication by the Parliamentary Office 5/2014) 
and the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (Prime Minister’s 
Office Publications 09/2016). The Foreign and Security Policy Report analyses 
Finland’s operating environment and presents the key priorities and goals of Finland’s 
foreign and security policy. The Defence Report takes into account the changes in the 
political-military operating environment. Its scope extends beyond the present 
Government’s term in office, reaching into the mid-2020s. 
Implementing the Defence Report  guarantees Finland’s defence capability in a 
constantly changing security situation, creates the conditions for maintaining a 
defence system that covers the entire territory of the country, provides guidelines for 
the execution of strategic capability programmes and improves the Defence Forces’ 
readiness. It also guides the deepening of defence cooperation and the review of 
national legislation. 
Finland’s military operating environment has changed. Military activity and military 
tensions have increased in the Baltic Sea region. The early-warning period for military 
crises has become shorter and the threshold for using force has lowered.   
As a result of the increasingly complex nature of war a wide range of measures could 
be used against Finland. The demands on defence have grown. Finland must prepare 
for the use of military force, or threat thereof, against it. 
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Procurements have been curtailed and postponed due to the appropriation cuts 
imposed on the Defence Forces, and it has become necessary to shift resources from 
defence materiel acquisitions to cover operating expenses. 
Finland strengthens its national defence and intensifies international defence 
cooperation. Land, maritime and air defence, as well as joint capabilities, will be 
developed in line with the requirements of the operating environment. New 
capabilities will be created for the cyber domain. The Defence Forces’ strategic 
capability programmes will be implemented so as to safeguard Finland’s defence 
capability in the long term. The defence system will be developed without creating any 
practical impediments to a potential membership in a military alliance. 
Defence cooperation is important to Finland’s defence capability and from the 
standpoint of threat prevention. Bilateral defence cooperation with Sweden enjoys a 
special status and the United States is an important partner for Finland. Finland 
purposefully promotes the development of defence cooperation within the European 
Union and the development of its defence policy. This will strengthen the foundation 
of the European defence capability and the Union as a security community and a 
global actor. 
By sustaining the level of investment in new materiel that will begin in 2021, as rec-
ommended by the Parliamentary Assessment Group, most troops can only be 
equipped and trained for their tasks to a satisfactory level. On top of this, the im-
provement of readiness will require additional resources starting from 2018. Finland’s 
credible defence rests on the guidelines and resources presented by this Report. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Government Report on Defence to Parliament provides the defence policy 
guidelines for the manner in which Finland’s defence capability is maintained, 
developed and used. The Defence Report and its implementation will ensure that 
Finland’s defence capability meets the requirements of the security environment. 
The Defence Report is a continuum on the Final Report of the Parliamentary 
Assessment Group (Publication by the Parliamentary Office 5/2014) and the 
Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (Prime Minister’s Office 
Publications 09/2016). The Foreign and Security policy Report analyses Finland’s 
operating environment and presents the key priorities and goals of Finland’s foreign 
and security policy. 
The Defence Report builds on the estimates and guidelines presented in the Foreign 
and Security Policy Report and concentrates on the changes in the military operating 
environment and the development of defence. Its scope extends into the mid-2020s. 
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2 THE MILITARY OPERATING 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
The security situation in Finland’s vicinity has deteriorated following the occupation of 
Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Military tension has risen in the Baltic Sea 
region, and insecurity has grown far and wide. 
The military-strategic importance of the Baltic Sea region has risen and military 
activity has intensified in the area. Simultaneously, the military footprint in the Arctic 
region has grown. As it is a base with strategic weapons, the Kola Peninsula retains 
its importance to Russia. 
The states in Finland’s vicinity have reacted to the transformation of the security 
environment by improving their military readiness, by procuring new materiel, and by 
increasing their defence spending. Member States of the EU and NATO intend to 
intensify and deepen their defence cooperation. Sweden has returned the focus of its 
armed forces’ development from crisis management to defending its own territory. 
Materiel and troops have now permanently been based in Gotland. Lithuania will 
reinstitute general conscription. 
Russia aims to strengthen its great-power status, and it has expressed the goal of a 
sphere-of-influence based security regime. It has demonstrated the ability to take swift 
strategic decisions and to employ coordinated military force and a wide range of other 
instruments in pursuing its objectives. 
Alongside the protracted conflict in Ukraine, Russia has specifically demonstrated its 
sophisticated and wide-ranging air power in the Syrian War. Russia is developing the 
capabilities of its armed forces and is also maintaining the capacity to manage a 
major military crisis. All security authorities’ capabilities can be used for military 
purposes. Russia has bolstered its western defences as well as its response and 
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readiness in the Arctic. Much as in the West, Russia focuses the material 
development of its armed forces on long-range strike capability and precision-guided 
weapons, manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, robotics, nuclear weapons, 
air and space defence as well as digital command & control and intelligence systems 
(C4ISR). 
Russia aims to challenge NATO’s capability to defend the Baltic States and eastern 
Europe should a military crisis flare up. Russia employs long-range weapon systems 
capable of destroying targets and creating anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) exclusion 
zones in airspace and sea areas. All services’ high-readiness formations stationed 
around the country can be rapidly deployed to the desired theatre without early 
warning, to occupy a limited area and challenge the sovereignty of the targeted state, 
among other things. 
NATO has reinstated the defence of the territory of its members as its core task; most 
NATO nations are now investing more in their own defence. NATO has stepped up its 
Article 5 related exercises and keeps developing its military readiness with the aim of 
stabilising security in its own area. NATO’s presence is increasing in the Baltic Sea 
region as the United States and certain other NATO nations are aiming at 
strengthening the defence of the Baltic States and eastern Europe by positioning 
troops and materiel in the region. 
The European Union is strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) and intensifying defence cooperation. The goal is to be able to manage 
security challenges, external and internal alike. The mutual assistance clause (Article 
42(7), TEU) of the Treaty of Lisbon improves the possibilities for developing defence 
cooperation among the Member States. Even though most EU Member States rely on 
NATO with regard to defending their territory, the Union still plays an important role in 
enabling European defence cooperation and as an actor of comprehensive security. 
The cyber domain is becoming increasingly important. The use of cyber operations for 
the purpose of pursuing political objectives cannot be excluded. The digitalisation of 
society, the dependency of technical systems on trans-border IT networks as well as 
the interdependencies and vulnerabilities of systems expose society’s vital functions 
to cyber-attacks. Both cyber-attacks and psychological operations (PSYOP) have 
targeted, among other things, critical infrastructure, industrial plants, political decision-
making systems and citizens in our neighbourhood as well as in Finland. Scientific 
and technological advances also pose other kinds of challenges to preparedness 
against threats. Wide-ranging chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
threats persist. 
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FACTORS AFFECTING F INLAND’S DEFENCE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 
- The early-warning period for military crises has shortened and the threshold for using 
force has become lower. At the same time society’s vulnerability has increased. 
- Military activity has intensified in the Baltic Sea region. 
- A conflict in the Baltic Sea region would inevitably impact Finland’s security. 
- It is questionable whether access to the airspace and sea area of the Baltic Sea region 
would be free during a potential crisis. Interference of shipping and blocking Finland’s sea 
lines of communication to the west would impact the whole of society. 
- The use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded. 
- As the nature of war is becoming more complex, the range of instruments employed 
against Finland would be wide and include both military and non-military means. 
- The defence of Finland calls for the ability to carry out land, maritime, air and cyberspace 
operations. The requirements imposed by the operating environment highlight, among 
other things, intelligence capability, agility from different administrative branches in 
rapidly developing situations, defence against long-range weapon systems and a cyber-
defence capability.. 
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3 THE PRESENT STATE OF 
DEFENCE 
 
The Finnish Defence Forces reform, carried out from 2012–2014, adapted the size 
and the basic structure of the Defence Forces to meet stringent financial demands 
and the then lower threat level of the security environment. The defence budget was 
cut by approximately 10 per cent. The reform’s savings goals were met. During the 
defence reform the number of salaried personnel was reduced to approximately 12 
000 employees. The Defence Forces’ service activities and logistics were 
concentrated. The wartime strength was reduced to 230 000 troops.  
During the implementation of the reform a financing shortfall on the Defence Forces 
operating expenses was created. This was generated by additional cuts and 
obligations imposed on the Defence Forces as well as cost increases, and from 
having to react to the transformation of the security environment. These resulted in 
postponing and curtailing defence procurements. It has become necessary to shift 
resources from defence materiel acquisitions to cover operating expenses. 
The reduced volume of the Defence Forces’ exercises, owing to the cost-cutting 
measures, was reinstated to an acceptable level as of 2015. In line with Prime 
Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government Programme financing for materiel investments, 
slashed during the Defence Forces reform, has gradually been increased to the level 
proposed by the Parliamentary Assessment Group (2014). Preparations for replacing 
the Navy’s vessels and the capability of the Air Force’s multi-role fighters have begun 
in the form of capability programmes. They require separate financing decisions. 
The Defence Forces’ readiness is created in normal conditions. It must be possible to 
launch the actions required by defence with the Defence Forces’ existing materiel and 
resources. The capability to repel an attack exists in the immediately available troops 
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and systems. Sizeable defence preparations and supplementary defence acquisitions 
are more difficult to complete during a rapidly escalating crisis. The present financial 
resources set a limit on the Defence Forces’ preparedness for a drawn-out crisis or 
warfare. 
At present the Army’s capability to carry out its mission is adequate. When it comes to 
maintaining the Army’s capability it is essential to be able to complete the planned 
projects. While the procurements that replace the Army’s ageing equipment do 
improve its capability, it will be impossible to fill all existing capability gaps through 
acquisitions. 
At present the Navy’s capability to carry out its mission is good. The capability and 
readiness of vessel and coastal units are maintained and in part developed to suit the 
tasks of normal and emergency conditions. In the 2020s the capability of the vessel 
classes that will be decommissioned will be replaced in a manner that maintains the 
capability for monitoring and securing territorial integrity, and for protecting merchant 
shipping and repelling attacks from the sea. 
At present the Air Force’s capability to carry out its mission is good. The capability of 
the Hornet multi-role fighters has been sustained through mid-life updates. An air-to-
ground (AG) capability, which supports the battle of the Army and the Navy, has been 
created as planned. Ground-based air defence (GBAD) missile systems have been 
procured to improve the air defence of society’s vital targets and Army troops. A great 
deal of GBAD equipment will be phased out in the mid-2020s and the service life of 
the Hornet system will come to an end at the same time. Replacing the equipment will 
be critical for monitoring and securing territorial integrity, fighter defence and the AG 
capability. 
Carrying out the tasks of the Defence Forces requires higher readiness in land, 
maritime, air and cyberspace operations as well as better long-range strike capability. 
There are shortcomings in the regional coverage and survivability of intelligence and 
surveillance, command and control, and logistic systems. The changed security 
environment and technological advances, among other things, have highlighted the 
need for legislative review as regards the authorities being able to carry out their 
duties. 
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- There lies an imbalance between the requirements for defence development and the 
present level of resources. Without any corrective action Finland’s  defence would 
degrade. 
- The defence capability must be developed as a whole, taking into account all services 
and capability areas. 
- The Defence Forces’ key equipment that is to be phased out will be replaced in order to 
maintain land, maritime and air defence capability, and to safeguard Finland’s overall 
defence capability. 
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4 MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING 
THE DEFENCE CAPABILITY 
 
The defence capability will secure Finland’s independence and territorial integrity; it 
comprises of military capabilities and collaboration among the national authorities as 
well as international defence cooperation. The defence capability will be maintained 
and developed in an operating environment that is in constant flux. 
Finland is a country which does not belong to any military alliance. It carries out 
practical cooperation with NATO and continues to maintain the option to seek NATO 
membership. Finland strengthens its national defence and intensifies international 
defence cooperation as a militarily non-aligned country. Participation in international 
cooperation serves Finland’s interests. Cooperation is increasingly important from the 
standpoint of maintaining, developing and utilising the national defence. The demands 
posed by the operating environment require an effective and rapidly deployable 
military capability which, for its part, strengthens stability in the Baltic Sea region. 
The systematic development of the defence capability builds on decisions taken over 
the course of decades. Readiness which meets the demands of the operating envi-
ronment’s transformation as well as rapidly deployable forces and systems and a 
large, trained reserve improve Finland’s chances to respond to a rapidly developing or 
a drawn-out military crisis. 
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4.1 Defence policy guidelines  
The increasingly tense security situation in Europe and the Baltic Sea region has 
repercussions on Finland. Despite the increasingly tense international situation 
Finland is not under any immediate military threat. Nonetheless, Finland must prepare 
for the use or threat of military force against it. As a Member State of the European 
Union Finland could not remain an outsider should threats to security emerge in its 
vicinity or elsewhere in Europe.  
Finland’s foreign and security policy guidelines have been determined in the 
Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (Prime Minister’s Office 
Publications 9/2016). The primary aim of Finland’s foreign and security policy is to 
avoid becoming a party to a military conflict. Finland will independently make 
decisions on security and defence policy. Finland pursues an active policy of stability 
to prevent military threats. This policy is supported by maintaining a national defence 
capability. Finland will actively and extensively strengthen its international defence 
cooperation and other networking as well as develop the abilities to provide and 
receive international assistance. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament has submitted a report on the 
Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy (UaVM 9/2016). In its 
report the Committee states that the aim of Finland’s foreign and security policy is to 
avoid becoming a party to a military conflict. The Committee agrees with the guideline 
of the report, according to which Finland implements an active policy of stability to 
prevent military threats. It also agrees with the annotation that Finland does not have 
the option or desire to isolate itself from its operating environment, and that Finland, 
as a Member State of the European Union, could not remain an outsider should 
threats to security emerge in its vicinity or elsewhere in Europe. In its report the 
Committee considers that Finland will not allow the use of its territory for hostile 
purposes against other states. On the basis of the Government Report on Finnish 
Foreign and Security Policy this does not limit Finland’s prospects to provide and 
receive international assistance or to intensify defence cooperation. 
Finland’s defence is being developed to satisfy the growing demands of the operating 
environment. Finland must be able to resist military pressure and a rapidly escalating 
military threat, and repel a large-scale attack. 
In addition to traditional military threats Finland prepares to meet increasingly complex 
challenges which amalgamate both military and non-military means. External and 
internal security are ever more distinctly intertwined. Preparedness will be 
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implemented in line with the concept of comprehensive security and by reviewing 
legislation. The defence capability which is maintained against external threats is an 
element of Finland’s comprehensive security and one of society’s vital functions. The 
maintenance of the defence capability requires close cooperation among the different 
actors of society. The rapid deployment of the resources and capabilities of the 
authorities and partners is ensured through partnership and security agreements, 
memoranda of understanding and joint exercises.  
The Defence Forces will provide executive assistance to the authorities responsible 
for internal security and to other authorities in accordance with requests for executive 
assistance and contingency plans. Finland’s general conscription system and the 
citizens’ strong will to defend the country bolster society’s crisis resilience. 
Deterrence relies on the kind of readiness and capability to repel attacks which is 
appropriately tailored to its operating environment. Finland prepares to repel military 
threats by maintaining its present-day defence solution which relies on effective 
weaponry and a large reserve. Immediately available national military capabilities are 
required to manage rapidly escalating crises.  
Finland will create the ability to provide and receive military assistance. The ability to 
receive military assistance is one element of the national defence capability. The pro-
vision and reception of military assistance will be taken into account in the central 
government’s preparedness and exercises, and in defence planning. This calls for 
collaboration in planning, shared situational awareness, compatible C2 and surveil-
lance systems as well as training and exercise cooperation, and interoperability. 
4.2 Development of defence cooperation 
Defence cooperation strengthens defence in normal and emergency conditions. It also 
enhances deterrence and improves the chances of receiving political and military 
assistance when needed. However, defence cooperation does not provide any 
security guarantees to Finland akin to those given to a member of a military alliance. 
Peacetime cooperation lays the foundation for cooperation during crises. Trust, a 
necessary requisite for defence cooperation, is established through tenacious and 
enduring action. By means of a wide network of partners Finland develops such 
arrangements that can be utilised to receive all possible assistance already at the 
onset of a potential crisis. 
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Finland continues to participate in international training and exercises, military crisis 
management and in other international activities. The focus of training and exercises 
is on participation in demanding international exercises. Finland continues to invite 
international partners to its national exercises, which can be combined with partners’ 
exercises. 
Participation in military crisis management is part of conducting  Finland’s foreign and 
security policy  and international cooperation. The goal is to develop national defence 
capability. Finland participates in increasingly complex crisis management in ever 
more demanding and high-risk operating environments. Finland takes into account the 
changes in international crisis management and evaluates its participation in military 
crisis management from the standpoint of effectiveness and national goals. 
For Finland the European Union is a security policy choice and a value community. 
Finland actively participates in the development and implementation of the CSDP. 
The EU’s solidarity clause (Article 222, TFEU) and the mutual assistance clause 
(Article 42(7), TEU) strengthen the Union as a security community and increase 
solidarity among the Member States. Sectors important to Finland include, inter alia, 
crisis management, providing and receiving assistance, responding to hybrid threats, 
developing defence cooperation and capabilities, creating arrangements for security 
of supply as well as strengthening the defence industrial and technological base. 
Finland promotes the development of defence cooperation within the European Union 
and supports the Union’s permanent structured cooperation and strengthening its 
crisis management planning and C2 capability. Cooperation with NATO is important in 
developing the European defence cooperation. Finland must be active in advancing 
any opportunities for cooperation in the EU and NATO. 
NATO is an actor in advancing transatlantic and European  security and stability. 
Finland promotes the deepening of cooperation under the auspices of NATO’s 
Enhanced Opportunity Programme (EOP) and the ’28 (NATO) +2 (Finland & Sweden)’ 
meetings, by utilising the possibilities open to partner countries in, among other 
things, training and exercises and in the development of shared situational 
awareness. While carefully monitoring the developments in its security environment, 
Finland maintains the option to seek NATO membership. As Finland keeps 
developing its defence capability, it continues to take into account the prospects for 
defence cooperation and interoperability, and ensures the elimination of any practical 
impediments to a possible membership in a military alliance. 
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Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) will be intensified, among other things, in 
situational awareness cooperation and in training and exercises. Finland aims to 
increase the Nordic use of naval and air bases and training areas so as to generate 
flexible and efficient exercises. In the field of defence materiel, Nordic materiel 
projects will continue and industrial cooperation will be further developed. Finland 
supports the cooperation among NORDEFCO and the Baltic States as well as that 
among the respective defence establishments within the ‘Northern Group’. 
Sweden enjoys a special status in Finland’s bilateral cooperation. Defence 
cooperation with Sweden aims at strengthening the security of the Baltic Sea region 
as well as the defence capabilities of both countries. Finland and Sweden will deepen 
their mutual cooperation which is being developed to facilitate operational planning in 
all situations. Examples of these may include the protection of territorial integrity or 
exercising the inherent right of collective self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. No predetermined limits will be set on deepening the bilateral defence 
cooperation. Finland will actively participate in this cooperation. 
The United States is an important partner for Finland and defence cooperation with it 
improves Finland’s defence capability. Finland continues its close materiel 
cooperation and deepens other defence cooperation and collaboration with the United 
States according to the Statement of Intent on bilateral defence cooperation. This 
includes, inter alia, deepening bilateral dialogue on defence policy, exchanging 
information, enhancing defence capability, readiness and interoperability, training and 
exercise cooperation as well as materiel and research collaboration. 
Important bilateral defence cooperation partners for Finland also include the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Poland, France, Germany, Denmark and 
Estonia. Latvia and Lithuania are also close partners for Finland. Bilateral frameworks 
will be set up to facilitate bilateral cooperation; they will make defence cooperation 
easier to steer and more systematic. 
International materiel cooperation lays the foundation for developing the material 
capability of defence. International materiel cooperation will be deepened among the 
Nordic countries, between the European Union and NATO, and bilaterally. Finland 
participates in international arms and export control cooperation as well as in 
confidence and security building measures, including their development. 
The defence establishment maintains and develops the capability for innovation and 
anticipation, ensures sufficient support for capability development and the precondi-
tions for international research cooperation as well as the competency required for 
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defence. The Defence Forces will gradually increase the total level of financing for 
research and development. 
4.3 The focus areas of using and maintaining 
the defence system 
Finland’s defence requires an entirety consisting of land, maritime and air defence 
and  joint capabilities supporting them, all tailored to the operating environment, and 
the ability to receive international assistance. The units and systems in highest 
readiness will be used nationwide. The large reserve provides regional coverage for 
the defence and sustainability during a drawn-out or wide-ranging crisis. 
The rapid reaction units (RRU) that include all services’ troops, equipped with 
effective and modern systems, will primarily aim to prevent the escalation of a 
situation into an attack against Finland. When required, a centre of gravity will be 
established for the defence and the attack against Finland will be repelled. If the crisis 
draws out or intensifies, more forces can be mobilised, if necessary. 
The transformation of the security environment demands that the defence system be 
capable of higher readiness and joint operations. Readiness is regulated on the basis 
of continuous monitoring of the surroundings and on early-warning, both of which 
make it possible to launch actions at the correct time. The Defence Forces must be 
able to regulate readiness flexibly and rapidly, use military force in different situations 
and create and reposition the centre of gravity of the defence everywhere in Finland. 
The actions of the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the Defence Forces’ joint 
capabilities are coordinated in joint operations, led by Defence Command Finland. 
The military services make use of the Defence Forces’ shared C4ISR and logistics. 
The Defence Forces prepare to carry out military defence according to the concept of 
comprehensive security, in concert with the other authorities and partners. 
On the basis of their usage the Defence Forces’ forces are divided into manoeuvre 
(operational), regional and local forces. The regional forces are used for creating 
regional defence coverage. The manoeuvre forces create the centre of gravity of the 
defence and fight the decisive battles. The local forces participate in battle and 
provide security, surveillance and support to the manoeuvre and regional forces in 
their area and assist them in maintaining contact with the other authorities. In terms of 
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deployability the Defence Forces maintain troops in different stages of readiness. 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic grouping of troops. 
 
Figure 1: Basic grouping of the Defence Forces´ troops 
 
 
The Border Guard participates in national defence. The Border Guard’s high 
readiness, powers and capabilities will be utilised to support the defence system in 
monitoring and securing territorial integrity. Should the situation so require, Border 
Guard units will be attached to the Defence Forces; they will be used in land and 
maritime defence as a part of the defence system. The Border Guard’s defence 
planning and associated preparations will be carried out in close cooperation with the 
Defence Forces. 
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The focus areas of maintaining and using the defence system during the span of the 
Defence Report are: 
− All services’ readiness. 
− Replacing the capabilities to be phased out, and 
− Intelligence, cyber-defence and long-range strike capability. 
 
The full mobilisation of wartime forces requires supplementary materiel procurements  
as well as resources commandeered from society. Finland will improve the capability 
to defend the entire territory of the country by intensifying the use of the forces which 
are not presently included in the wartime strength of 230 000 troops. The wartime 
mobilisation organisation will be merged into the local forces, and conscripts having 
reached a sufficient degree of training will be used to raise readiness and in military 
tasks during times of crisis. The Border Guard units attached to the Defence Forces 
will also be included in the overall strength, should this become necessary in times of 
crisis. This being the case, the total wartime strength will rise to 280 000 troops. 
4.3.1 Land defence 
Land defence will prevent and repel a land attack against Finland. Land defence will 
create the required nationwide, regional and local coverage, prevent the occupation of 
territory, support the other authorities in securing the vital functions of society and, 
with the support of air and maritime defence, defeat the aggressor on the ground. 
Territorial defence and its implementation, the Army Land Warfare doctrine, will be 
developed to measure up to the changes of the security environment. Development of 
readiness, agility and mobile operations along with being able to concentrate striking 
power on key targets are highlighted in the activities of the Army. 
During this decade the focus of developing the Defence Forces is on the Army and, 
especially, its rapid reaction units (RRU). 
In rapidly escalating situations the Army’s immediately available readiness formations 
and units will carry out demanding tasks of executive assistance, provide security for 
the critical targets of the Defence Forces and those of society, and be used in 
situations where the threat of using military force exists. The role of salaried personnel 
and conscripts is highlighted in the early stages of a crisis. 
When necessary, the Army will mobilise rapid reaction units to boost the deterrence of 
defence. If necessary, more forces will be mobilised with which the Army will create 
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the capability to repel the attack, defeat the aggressor as part of the Defence Forces’ 
joint operations and meet the requirements of managing a drawn-out crisis. 
The Army’s ability to repel a large-scale attack will be retained. The doctrines of the 
Army’s regional and local forces, including their capability and equipment, will be 
tailored to the demands of and resources for their planned areas of operation. The 
relative share of light troops will increase. 
Among other things, the Army’s mobility, firepower and striking power will be 
improved by modernising the BMP-2M armoured combat vehicles, carrying out the 
mid-life update of the CV9030 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and by procuring Leopard 2A6 
main battle tanks. The Army’s surveillance and targeting capability will be improved 
and new generation anti-tank weaponry and munitions will be purchased. A new self-
propelled artillery system, possessing great firepower, will replace ageing artillery 
systems. 
The deterrent effect which was lost through the elimination of infantry landmines will 
be replaced through other means. The Defence Forces will study the options and 
feasibility of domestic defence industrial innovations. The deadline for the study is the 
end of 2017. 
4.3.2 Maritime defence 
The integrity of Finland’s territorial waters and the vital sea lines of communication will 
be protected through maritime defence. Attacks from the sea will be repelled with the 
support of land and air defence. The changed security environment of the Baltic Sea 
and Finland’s dependency on shipping require versatility, survivability and high 
readiness from the maritime defence. These help prevent and limit the possibility of 
isolating Finland by sea, and of the aggressor being able to concentrate his weapons 
effect on our vital targets or functions.  
The prerequisites of maritime operations in normal and emergency conditions are a 
recognised maritime picture (RMP) from below and above the surface and from the air 
generated with fixed and mobile maritime surveillance systems and vessels, and the 
ability to use fire at all times. The integrity of territorial waters is monitored and 
protected with maritime surveillance systems and vessels capable of repelling 
territorial violations as well as anti-submarine warfare, in concert with the other 
maritime authorities. The sea lines of communication are secured by protecting the 
appropriate sea areas, channels and waterways with anti-submarine warfare, sea 
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mines as well as anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons systems. When necessary, sea 
areas will be protected through mine laying. 
Attacks from the sea will be repelled with concentrated fire, the key elements of which 
are anti-ship and coastal missiles, and sea mines. Sea mines will protect our own 
operations and limit those of the adversary and deny his access to our vital areas. 
Fleet units and mobile coastal troops with effective firepower will create the centre of 
gravity of defence in the desired sector. If necessary, the aggressor will be defeated 
with the support of the Defence Forces’ joint capabilities and the other services. The 
Navy will support land and air defence, among other things, through fire support and 
by participating in air surveillance.  
The maritime defence will be developed for higher-tempo and more mobile maritime 
operations. Through the capabilities that will be procured the Navy can rapidly and 
flexibly regulate readiness, carry out surveillance and use fire, and create a centre of 
gravity of defence in sea areas and the littoral zone. 
The anti-ship missile system of the Hamina-class fast-attack craft, scheduled for 
overhaul, will be replaced and the ships will be equipped with anti-submarine warfare 
systems and torpedoes. The mine laying and transport capability will be retained with 
the overhauled Pansio-class minelayers. A new class of vessels will supersede the 
combat vessels that will be decommissioned in the 2020s. The mine countermeasures 
capability will be retained with Katanpää-class minehunters and anti-mine combat 
diver units. 
The backbone of the coastal troops consists of a mobile coastal battlegroup equipped 
with ample firepower as well as new anti-ship missile units and fire support units. The 
firepower, mobility and C4 systems of the coastal troops will be developed. 
The capability of the fixed surveillance system will be ensured by maintaining the pre-
sent surface surveillance systems and by launching the modernisation of the under-
water surveillance system. 
4.3.3 Air defence 
Air defence will prevent and repel air attacks against Finland and limit the aggressor’s 
possibilities for using his air power without warning and from afar. 
The Air Force maintains a recognised air picture (RAP) and the readiness to 
immediately react in the manner required by the operating environment. The 
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nationwide command and control of air defence and the centralised control of fighter 
defence will be made possible by means of a networked C4ISR system. The air 
defence will protect the raising of readiness and mobilisation and, for its part, facilitate 
land and maritime defence by denying the aggressor air supremacy. Air operations 
are supported by land and maritime defence. 
The Air Force’s high readiness and capable multi-role fighters enable air defence over 
the entire territory of Finland. Multi-role fighters carry out the monitoring of territorial 
integrity and engage targets in the air, on land and the sea, and supplement the 
Defence Forces’ command & control and intelligence system (C4ISR). A multi-layered 
ground-based air defence (GBAD) system protects sites and troops, and incurs losses 
to the adversary both regionally and locally. The networked air defence system, 
comprising the Air Force and the GBAD, is able to engage different kinds of threats, 
ranging from manned aircraft and unmanned air vehicles to cruise missiles. The Air 
Force provides air-to-surface fire support to land and maritime defence. 
A sufficient network of air bases and mobile troops will be maintained to improve 
survivability. The self-sufficiency of the multi-role fighters and GBAD will be secured 
by maintaining sufficient stockpiles of weaponry and spares as well as domestic 
know-how. 
During this decade the maintenance and servicing of aircraft and GBAD systems will 
be secured, air bases will be furnished with special materials, and their structures will 
be improved in accordance with the requirements of the operating environment. The 
goal of GBAD development is to achieve a sufficient high-altitude defence capability 
and regional cover. In order to maintain the defence capability, the Hornet fleet’s 
capability, which is to be phased out in the mid-2020s, will be replaced in full to meet 
the requirements of the security environment. 
The capability of the air surveillance systems which are about to be phased out will be 
replaced at the end of the next decade. The development of low-observable aircraft 
and drones warrants a study of new surveillance technologies. 
4.3.4 Joint defence capabilities 
Early warning of military threats against Finland calls for sophisticated intelligence and 
surveillance capability and international cooperation. Military intelligence information-
gathering methods will be developed for these threats. The Defence Forces will create 
an entirety of military intelligence, surveillance and targeting support. 
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The Defence Forces will continue developing a cyber-defence capability in 
accordance with the national Cyber Security Strategy. The Defence Forces will 
establish the capability for compiling cyber situational awareness, for planning and 
implementing cyber operations, and for protecting and monitoring our own systems in 
the cyber domain. 
The ability to rapidly engage targets at a distance embodies the essence of military 
deterrence in the 2020s. More munitions will be procured for long-range weapon 
systems and targeting will be improved. The capability of the Special Forces to carry 
out reconnaissance and raids will be retained. Mid-life updates on the helicopter fleet 
will guarantee the mobility and reaction capability of Special Forces and readiness 
units, and the provision of support to the services’ other forces. 
The functioning of the restructured logistic system will be consolidated on the basis of 
lessons learned from exercises and from crisis management. Competency and 
access to critical materiel and information resources will be guaranteed nationally. 
The functioning of the Defence Forces’ international acquisition channels and 
contacts as well as the availability of materiel will be secured. The explosives 
production and life-cycle management model will be developed. 
Combat Service Support will be developed in accordance with readiness requirements 
to sustain the troops during a drawn-out crisis. The ability to receive assistance will be 
taken into account in the development of logistics. 
In its telecommunications the Defence Forces will utilise the security authorities’ 
network and continue to conjoin and streamline the defence telecommunications 
network. The technical structure will be developed to meet the Defence Forces’ 
readiness requirements and serve exercises, territorial surveillance and other 
operations. Off-the-shelf equipment will increasingly be used to support command and 
control. The Defence Forces’ own IT systems will primarily support battle 
management. 
As part of multinational cooperation, such technical and functional solutions will be 
developed which, when necessary, will enable the coupling of different countries’ C2 
systems together. 
The compositions, doctrine and defence materiel of Border Guard units will be 
developed as part of the defence system, together with the Defence Forces. The 
development will particularly take into account higher readiness requirements. 
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4.3.5 Strategic capability programmes 
In the 2020s Finland’s defence will face an exceptional situation when the main 
systems of two services will be phased out almost simultaneously. The Navy’s vessel 
project and the Air Force’s fighter programme, which replace the capabilities to be 
decommissioned, are indispensable strategic programmes for the defence of Finland. 
In accordance with the Government Programme, preparations for replacing the Navy’s 
vessels (Squadron 2020 project) and the capability of the Air Force’s multi-role 
fighters (HX programme) have been launched. Both programmes are based on 
research and analysis on the future operating environment. 
Maritime and air defence are a prerequisite for the functioning of the entire defence 
system, for carrying out the Defence Forces’ tasks in normal conditions, for monitoring 
and securing territorial integrity and for preventing and repelling a possible attack. The 
programmes are of great importance to Finland’s security and defence policy. 
 
Squadron 2020 project 
The Rauma-class fast-attack craft and Hämeenmaa-class minelayers will reach the 
end of their service lives by the mid-2020s. The maritime defence capability will be 
preserved through the Squadron 2020’s vessels and the Hamina-class fast-attack 
craft, scheduled for overhaul. The Squadron 2020 project entails replacing and 
modernising the capabilities of the seven vessels which will have been or are 
scheduled to be decommissioned against contemporary threats. 
The four vessels of Squadron 2020 will be capable of year-round, long-endurance 
patrols in all weather and ice conditions of the Baltic Sea, mobile protection of 
territorial integrity, command and control of maritime operations and ASW, mine 
laying as well as anti-surface warfare (ASUW) and anti-aircraft defence. The tasks 
require that the vessels have the ability to generate a recognised maritime picture 
(RMP) from the air and from below and above the surface. 
The capability of the Squadron 2020’s vessels is planned to be viable into the 2050s. 
The estimated cost of the project is EUR 1.2 billion. 
HX programme 
The planned service life of the Hornet fleet will come to an end between 2025 and 
2030. There are three major factors that limit the service life of the fleet: the 
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weakening comparative capabilities of the Hornets, structural fatigue and challenges 
in obtaining system support. Nationwide air defence and the maintenance of 
deterrence necessitate replacing the Air Force’s key defence system with capable 
multi-role fighters from 2025 onwards. 
The multi-role fighters carry out territorial surveillance, engage targets in the air and 
on land and sea, and supplement the Defence Forces’ C4ISR system. Anti-aircraft 
defence capabilities will complement those of the multi-role fighter. It is not possible to 
substitute the Hornet fleet’s capability with GBAD systems or with any unmanned 
aerial vehicles already in operational use or on the design board; they would cover but 
a part of the Hornet fleet’s capability. The need and possibilities of procuring 
supplementary capabilities will be analysed as part of the HX programme. 
The capability of the new multi-role fighter is planned to be viable for at least 30 years, 
i.e. into the 2060s. The projected cost of the programme is EUR 7—10 billion. The 
procurement decision will be made in the early 2020s. 
4.4 The Defence Forces’ processes and 
personnel 
The Ministry of Defence is presently implementing an internal savings programme 
which aims to achieve the approved cuts in spending limits and curb mounting costs 
and expenses. 
In developing their processes and personnel system the Defence Forces are focusing 
on the essential while aiming at cost-effectiveness. The goal of partnerships is to 
secure support services and readiness in all conditions in a cost-effective manner. 
Ultimately, the wartime force structure determines the Defence Forces’ personnel 
structure. Furthermore, the Defence Forces’ spending limits, tasks, the development 
of new capabilities and the central government’s processes also play a role in this. 
Human resources will be allocated to the Defence Forces’ core tasks such as 
readiness and conscript training as well as to tasks required for maintaining and 
developing the new capabilities. 
Changes in the military pension system and the action required by the attrition of insti-
tute officers, intended to secure sufficient numbers of professional military personnel 
in the reserve, will impact the personnel structure. The personnel structure and the 
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reservist training system will be changed to suit the requirements of crisis conditions. 
As the personnel system is being developed, the requirements for international coop-
eration and military crisis management will be taken into account. Following the De-
fence Forces reform the number of salaried personnel, approximately 12 000 people, 
is the minimum needed for carrying out the Defence Forces’ present statutory tasks. 
4.5 Conscription 
General conscription and training the entire able-bodied annual intake of men produce 
the Defence Forces’ wartime troops in a cost-effective manner. Women’s voluntary 
military service will be developed as part of the system. The goal is to increase the 
number of women serving in crisis management duties. Call-ups will be improved by 
developing digital information services and processes, and by taking into account the 
conscripts’ special skills and abilities. 
Conscript training will be cost-effectively developed to meet the changed readiness 
requirements by utilising networks, virtual reality and simulations, among other things. 
New training arrangements will be gradually phased in. Digital services will be used in 
managing the conscripts’ affairs. 
The reservist training system is an entirety which comprises the Defence Forces’ 
refresher exercises and voluntary exercises as well as the courses organised by the 
National Defence Training Association of Finland. Reservists are encouraged to 
maintain physical fitness and to participate in internet-based training opportunities. 
Wartime forces will increasingly utilise the reservists’ civilian expertise. 
4.6 The will to defend the country and 
voluntary defence activities 
The transformation of the operating environment underlines society’s resilience, 
where the will to defend the country plays a central role. Voluntary defence is a theme 
shared by the entire population and the strong defence will of the Finns lays the 
foundation for the defence capability. Voluntary defence training organisations are 
partly responsible for sustaining this strong will. 
The will to defend the country is maintained through top-notch training and by 
supporting voluntary defence training. The National Defence Training Association of 
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Finland is developed as a strategic partner of the Defence Forces, in line with the 
Nordic concept. The goal is to strengthen the role of voluntary defence activities in 
local defence arrangements and in executive assistance. The prerequisites of 
voluntary defence will be safeguarded. 
4.7 Infrastructure 
The network of garrisons will be maintained at the level required by peacetime training 
and wartime needs. The Defence Forces’ premises management strategy, extending 
until 2030, evaluates the key internal and external factors of change for premises 
management, including the needs for development.  
Premises management adjustments seeks cost savings by the year 2020 which would 
stabilise potential cost rises. The adjustments will continue through actions that 
improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the premises. 
4.8 Research and development 
Developing and maintaining the Defence Forces’ capabilities requires systematic 
planning as well as steadfast, correctly-timed and sufficient resource allocation for 
research and development (R&D) for the entire service life of any given capability. 
The Defence Forces’ R&D resources must meet the requirements of the operating 
environment by guaranteeing the organisation’s capacity for innovation and 
anticipation, support for capability development, the preconditions for international 
R&D cooperation, and the volume of critical expertise for the defence. 
Domestic technology expertise supports the entirety of the defence system. The 
industry’s role as a partner is based on competency and technological expertise. 
Research and development is needed for creating knowhow and maintaining the 
industrial production and innovation capability in Finland. Cooperation among the 
defence establishment, the industry and research and innovation funds in the public 
sector will be intensified. 
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4.9 Military security of supply 
The Defence Forces’ wartime capabilities are largely based on resources allocated by 
the rest of society. Moreover, Finland is dependent on the availability of defence 
materiel from abroad. 
Military security of supply safeguards the functioning of the Defence Forces’ critical 
systems during disruptions in society. Technological expertise is developed to secure 
the functioning of these systems. The close international cooperation which serves 
this goal will be intensified among the authorities and the domestic and foreign 
defence industries. The export conditions of the domestic industry and its entry into 
the international marketplace will be supported. In its defence materiel exports Finland 
adheres to its international obligations. 
The technology areas that are critical to Finland’s defence were defined by the 
Government Resolution on Securing the Finnish Defence Technological and Industrial 
Base (MoD 2016); expertise pertaining to said areas shall be developed in Finland. 
4.10 Legislation 
Legislative projects improve readiness, inter-authority cooperation, territorial 
surveillance and information gathering. Furthermore, the development of legislation 
facilitates the provision and reception of international assistance, and participation in 
other international activities. 
The most important legislative project underway concerns military intelligence and, 
particularly, communications intelligence, systems intelligence and human 
intelligence. Moreover, the need for developing legislation for unmanned aerial 
vehicles and drones will be studied. Legislation concerning the provision and 
reception of executive assistance, the status of those possessing dual citizenship, and 
legislation that applies to buying land and real estate will be reviewed. When it comes 
to the preconditions of the authorities it is important to study the need to review the 
Emergency Powers Act.  
PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE PUBLICATIONS 7/2017 
 
31 
 
 
4.11 Resources 
A defence capability which meets the demands of the changes in the operating 
environment and the preconditions for developing its capability will be safeguarded. 
The identified sectors in maintaining and developing the capabilities for the span of 
the Defence Report include, in particular, readiness, intelligence, cyber defence, joint 
fires and replacing the capabilities that will be phased out.  
It is estimated that additional annual financing of EUR 55 million from 2018 onwards is 
needed to improve readiness so as to be able to respond to the changes in the 
security environment. 
As per the recommendations of the Final Report of the Parliamentary Assessment 
Group, additional annual financing of EUR 150 million from 2021 onwards, on top of 
index adjustments, is needed to maintain the level of the Defence Forces’ materiel 
investments. 
Preparations for the strategic capability programmes of the Navy and the Air Force 
(Squadron 2020 and HX) will continue, and the capabilities to be phased out will be 
replaced. The programmes will be financed through budgets from 2019-2031. The 
strategic capability programmes will be prepared in such a manner that their future 
maintenance and operating costs can be covered from defence budgets without the 
need for separate funding. 
The detailed financing decisions will be taken in connection with general government 
fiscal plans and budgets. 
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5 SUMMARY 
 
1. The military operating environment is in flux. The consequences of this 
change are estimated to continue for a long time. 
2. The concept of comprehensive security lays an appropriate foundation for 
intersectoral cooperation in the management of wide-ranging threats. Due to 
the increasingly complex nature of conflicts, the requirements for the Finnish 
concept of comprehensive security and for society’s crisis resilience must be 
thoroughly assessed during the next update of the Security Strategy for 
Society. 
3. The operating environment requires maintaining and developing the national 
defence capability. This will be supported through legislative projects and 
intensifying defence cooperation. 
4. Defence readiness will be improved. 
5. By implementing the guidelines of the Defence Report Finland’s defence will 
remain viable well into the coming decade. 
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Term Definition 
Air defence Air defence means the activities which are used to carry out air 
surveillance both within and near the national borders, secure the 
integrity of airspace, protect the vital functions of society against air 
attacks, wear down the enemy in the air and repel his air attack. All 
services and civilian authorities as well as the Border Guard 
participate in air defence. 
Border Guard forces Troops made up from the Border Guard’s regular personnel and 
conscripts serving in the Border Guard pursuant to the 
Conscription Act or those in voluntary military service. Border 
Guard troops, or parts thereof, can be attached to the Defence 
Forces when readiness is raised or when the national defence 
capability so requires.  
Build-up forces Defence Forces’ troops which create the ability to manage a 
drawn-out crisis by augmenting the forces that were mobilised 
earlier. 
Crisis resilience The capability to sustain functions in changing conditions and the 
ability to cope with disruptions and crises, and to recover from 
them. 
Cyber defence The national defence related sector of cyber security which 
incorporates the capabilities of intelligence, surveillance, cyber-
attack and cyber defence.  
Defence capability Finland’s defence capability comprises the defence system’s 
military capabilities and the resources attained through domestic 
and international defence cooperation. 
Defence cooperation Defence cooperation means such international defence policy and 
military cooperation which supports and strengthens Finland’s 
defence capability. 
Defence system An entirety comprising the Defence Forces’ command echelons as 
well as forces and systems, divided into subordinate systems. The 
subordinate systems contain the personnel, materiel and doctrines 
required to carry out the tasks of military defence. 
Early warning Early warning provided by military intelligence on such 
developments which could jeopardise Finland’s security or pose a 
threat. 
Joint operation A joint operation is one in which the operations of at least two 
services are coordinated to reach the military objective. The 
Defence Forces’ joint fires and capabilities can support joint 
operations. 
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Term Definition 
Land defence Land defence means the activities which help safeguard society’s 
vital functions and carry out territorial surveillance over the land 
area making it possible to slow down and wear out the aggressor’s 
land attack in selected terrain and ultimately defeat him. All 
services and civilian authorities as well as the Border Guard 
participate in land defence. 
Local forces Wartime troops which create nationwide coverage in defence 
through surveillance, protecting targets, mobilising forces and by 
providing support to the other authorities. 
Manoeuvre (operational)  
forces 
Wartime troops trained and equipped for nationwide combat, 
suitable for being used in versatile and demanding battle conditions 
in different operating environments. 
Maritime defence Maritime defence means the activities which are used to protect 
the vital functions of society at sea, carry out maritime surveillance, 
secure the integrity of the sea area and the sea lines of 
communication, wear down the enemy at sea and repel his sea 
attack. All services and civilian authorities as well as the Border 
Guard participate in maritime defence. 
Military capability Military capability comprises plans, manuals and doctrines, 
sufficient and competent personnel, the required materiel, the 
necessary infrastructure as well as a basing system operated by 
the Defence Forces or provided by society. 
Psychological operations 
(PSYOP) 
Action aimed at producing changes in the information environment. 
For example, changes can appear in system performance, access 
to information or in human behaviour. Methods used in PSYOP 
include electronic warfare, cyber-attacks, psychological operations 
and the physical destruction of targets. 
Readiness forces Troops intended for countering rapidly emerging threats. Their new 
elements include the following: 
- Readiness formations, which are primarily used for 
managing serious disruptions in normal conditions. They can 
also be used in military defence. 
- Readiness units, which are primarily used in military defence. 
They can also be used for executive assistance tasks. 
- Rapid Reaction Units (RRU), which create a deterrent effect 
on the use of military force against Finland. The RRUs facilitate 
the execution of vigorous and pro-active operations.  
Regional forces Wartime troops trained and equipped for regional battle as per the 
conditions of their intended area of deployment. 
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Term Definition 
Security of supply The ability to sustain the population’s basic economic functions for 
the purpose of safeguarding their livelihoods, the viability and 
security of society, and the required materiel for national defence 
during serious disruptions and emergency conditions. 
Special Forces Troops that are specially trained and equipped for versatile and 
unconventional operations; they usually operate in small teams. 
Targeting support Targeting support is used to prioritise, order and execute the 
acquisition and analysis of intelligence information required to carry 
out an attack. 
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